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ABSTRACT
Conventional detection and classification (“fingerprinting”)
problems involving network traffic commonly rely on ei-
ther rule-based expert systems or machine learning models
that are trained with manually engineered features derived
from network traffic. Automated approaches in this area are
typically tailored for specific problems. This paper presents
nPrint, a standard, packet-based representation of network
traffic that can be used as an input to train a variety of ma-
chine learning models without extensive feature engineering.
We demonstrate that nPrint offers a suitable traffic rep-
resentation for machine learning algorithms across three
common network traffic classification problems: device fin-
gerprinting, operating system fingerprinting, and application
identification. We show that models trained with nPrint are
at least as accurate as widely used tools, but in contrast
do not rely on brittle, manually updated rules and features.
Finally, we release nPrint as a publicly available software
tool to encourage further use, testing, and extensions to the
existing network traffic representation.
1 INTRODUCTION
Identifying or “fingerprinting” network devices, operating
systems, or applications based on network traffic is a com-
mon problem area in networking. From the network oper-
ations point of view, operators often need to identify ap-
plications and devices for a variety of reasons, including
identifying rogue devices or determining vulnerable devices
on the network [11]. In the realm of security and privacy,
fingerprinting may constitute a threat to privacy, and thus
understanding the capabilities and limitations of current fin-
gerprinting techniques can help shed more light on privacy
risks [9, 13, 25].
Fingerprinting typically relies on a combination of active
or passive network measurement, collection of correspond-
ing traffic, and commonly involves application of a set of
rules to the resulting traffic capture. For example, one com-
mon tool in device and operating system fingerprinting is
Nmap, which sends packets to devices to elicit responses that
are characteristic of a particular device and applies a fixed set
of rules to the corresponding responses; p0f , another pop-
ular fingerprinting tool, fingerprints operating systems by
examining passively captured network traffic and matching
aspects of that traffic (specifically, operating system-specific
defaults such as TCP options) to a set of rules that identify
the operating system [19, 23]. More broadly, the field of traf-
fic analysis aims to identify application traffic, devices, web
browsing behavior, and even human behavior from network
traffic patterns.
Yet, while the area of traffic fingerprinting is broad, many
fingerprinting tasks have generally involved devising a spe-
cific set of fingerprints (i.e., features and rules) for the corre-
sponding task [6, 9, 13, 17, 25, 33, 38]. Crafting these rules
is typically painstaking and manual; worse, the rules them-
selves are brittle: as new devices, applications, operating
systems, software updates, and behaviors emerge, the rules
need to be updated.
The emergence of a variety of supervised and unsuper-
vised machine learning algorithms creates new opportunities
for learning features and rules that can perform fingerprint-
ing. The success of anymachine learning approach ultimately
depends on presenting the models with appropriate repre-
sentations. Even in cases where traffic classification relies
on machine learning (e.g., denial of service attack detection,
botnet detection), traffic classification typically involves sig-
nificant manual feature engineering to derive features that
are characteristic of the classification task, ultimately train-
ing a model on those specific features. In many cases, feature
engineering requires a significant amount of effort. Even
with expert domain knowledge, the exploration and engi-
neering process is manual, and subject to a focus on unim-
portant features or omission of features that either were not
immediately apparent or involve complex relationships (e.g.,
non-linear relationships between features). Furthermore, as-
sumptions and uses can change over time, rendering models
and hand-crafted features obsolete.
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This paper explores takes a different approach, exploring
whether a single, standard network traffic representation
can apply to a broad array of traffic classification tasks. A
primary contribution of this paper is an in-depth evaluation
of whether a standard encoding of network traffic data can
yield as accurate performance for a variety of fingerprinting
tasks as bespoke representations and models that are tai-
lored to each task. We design a general packet representation,
nPrint that encodes data in a normalized, bit-aligned, space-
efficient format that facilitates representation learning which
automatically discovers the semantically important parts of
network packets. We apply nPrint to three network traffic
fingerprinting problems—devices, operating systems, and
applications—using three different machine learning models:
a random forest model, a multi-layer perceptron, and a con-
volutional neural network. We find that models trained with
nPrint representations for these three tasks work as well (or
better than) existing approaches, for a variety of models, sug-
gesting the promise for a universal, standard representation
of traffic that can apply to a variety of fingerprinting tasks.
We have implemented nPrint in a publicly available open-
source tool for others to use and extend. We envision exten-
sions to this work in a number of areas: First, although we
have demonstrated nPrint on three broad classes of finger-
printing problems, we encourage others to test the represen-
tation on a broader set of traffic analysis problems. Second,
the representation can be extended to capture other aspects
of network traffic that could be useful for fingerprinting
or classification: for example, nPrint supports representa-
tions on collections of packets (e.g., the first N packets in a
sequence) as well as temporal representations (e.g., packet
inter-arrival times) through relative timestamps. Future work
involves exploring how these aspects of the nPrint represen-
tation can potentially improve the accuracy of the finger-
printing methods we present in this paper.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes background on machine learning models and related
work applying these models to device and OS identification
and fingerprinting problems. Section 3 presents nPrint in
detail. Section 4 describes how nPrint fits into a standard
machine learning pipeline, as well as evaluating the perfor-
mance of nPrint in terms of packet transformation time, lines
of code necessary to customize nPrint for a given problem,
and the amount of time to train models used in this work.
Sections 5, 6, and 7 evaluate both the various representa-
tions and their applications to three contexts: active device
fingerprinting , passive OS detection, and application identi-
fication through DTLS handshakes. Section 8 concludes with
a discussion of open questions and future directions.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In this section, we provide background on machine learning
models and their applications and survey related work in
fingerprinting.
2.1 Machine Learning Models
Deep learning techniques have been extensively used in
other fields, including computer vision and image recog-
nition, to accurately classify images. Deep neural network
(DNN) architectures, such as convolutional neural networks
and mutli-layer perceptrons (MLP) are two of the most exten-
sively used deep learning architectures for supervised learn-
ing. Multi-layer perceptrons (MLP) are simple feed-forward
neural network architectures that consist of an input layer
with a number of neurons equal to the number of features
in the data, any number of hidden layers that are fully con-
nected to the next, and an output layer with a number of
neurons equal to the number of classes in the supervised
learning problem [12].
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are another exten-
sively used DNN architecture. CNNs consist of a convolu-
tional layer, which transforms input features using kernels,
M × N matrix that effectively applies a spatial filter (e.g.,
a smoothing operation) to the resulting input values [12].
Subsequently, pooling operation is applied to reduce the di-
mensionality of the features by replacing each output with a
summary statistic of a group of outputs. After one or more
convolutional layers, the network consists of one or more
fully connected layers and an output layer much like an
MLP. DNN architectures have been used extensively in cases
where it is possible to use raw data (e.g., images, audio) as in-
put, without engineering features a priori; as a result, DNNs
have been popular in image recognition and computer vision,
where it is straightforward to provide raw pixels as input to
a model.
2.2 Fingerprinting
Past research has applied both manual and automated ap-
proaches to fingerprint networked devices and applications.
TCP-based host fingerprinting. Idiosyncrasies between TCP/IP
stack implementations have often been the basis of net-
worked host fingerprinting techniques. Actively probing to
differentiate between TCP implementations was introduced
by Comer and Lin [7]. Padhye and Floyd identified differ-
ences between implementations [24]. Paxson passively iden-
tified TCP implementations passively using traffic traces [26].
Past work has also developed techniques to fingerprint
host operating systems. There are multiple tools and meth-
ods for host OS fingerprinting, using both active and passive
techniques. One common tool is Nmap [19], which sends
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Figure 1: Semantic and naive binary packet representations introduce various problems that make modeling difficult: Semantic representations
may assign relationships to continuous values where distance is meaningless (e.g., port numbers). Naive binary representations lack alignment,
which can confuse model training.
probes and examines the responses sent by a target host,
focusing on TCP/IP settings and Internet Control Messag-
ing Protocol (ICMP) implementation differences between
different operating systems and devices. Nmap is widely
considered the “gold standard” of active probing tools.
Passive OS identification aims to identify operating sys-
tems from passively captured network traffic [5, 18]. P0f pas-
sively observes traffic and determines the operating system
largely based on TCP behavior [23]. In contrast, the research
does not focus on heuristics and a priori knowledge of im-
plementation differences between host networking stacks.
Instead, we allow the model to learn the differences during
training.
Remote fingerprinting can be used to characterize aspects
of the remote system other than its operating system or net-
working stack. Clock skew information determined from the
TCP timestamp option was leveraged to identify individual
physical devices by Kohno et al. [17]. Formby et al. passively
fingerprint industrial control system devices [10].
Machine learning-based fingerprinting. Machine learning
techniques have been long used for network traffic classi-
fication and fingerprinting [2, 3, 35, 42]. Wang et al. devel-
oped an ML-based classification model to detect obfuscated
traffic [36]. Sommer and Paxson demonstrated that using
machine learning to detect anomalies can have significant
drawbacks, as network anomalies can exhibit different be-
havior than other problems solved by ML [32]. Many recent
works have used machine learning to identify websites vis-
ited through the Tor network [14, 25, 37, 39].
Machine learning techniques have recently garnered at-
tention as they have proven to be applicable to the task for
inferring information from encrypted network traffic. Vari-
ous work has used machine learning models to fingerprint
websites visited through the Tor network [22, 28, 31]. These
works differ from this work, due to their focus on the Tor set-
ting. In Tor, all packets are the same size, meaning network
traffic in Tor can be represented by a series of -1s and 1s
that represent the direction of the traffic. This work instead
considers traffic over any network that can vary in size and
protocol. Trimananda et al. used DBSCAN to identify smart
home device actions in network traffic [34].
Deep learning techniques have become popular for net-
work traffic classification problems [1, 16, 41, 43]. Yu et al.
used convolutional autoencoders for network intrusion de-
tection [43].Wang et al. argued one-dimensional convolution
neural networks are appropriate for network traffic rather
than two dimensional CNNs [41]. In contrast, nPrint aligns
packets, building two-dimensional representations over time
as packets are collected. Wang et al. applied an off-the-shelf
deep learning techniques from image recognition and text
analysis to intrusion detection; in contrast, we focus specifi-
cally on creating a general representation for network traffic
that can be used in a variety of different models, across a
broad class of problems[40]. Our results also suggest that
Wang et al.’s model may be more complex than necessary,
and that better input representations such as nPrint could
result in simpler models.
3 THE NPRINT REPRESENTATION
In this section, we enumerate the design requirements for
a standard data representation, explore various strawman
representations and explain why they are not suitable, and
describe the nPrint representation.
3.1 Design Requirements
The essence of nPrint involves transforming packets into a
representation that can be learned from and the ability to
transform all parts of each packet into the resulting repre-
sentation. As detailed in Section 2, deep learning techniques
have proven to work well with problems related to image
classification and computer vision, where pictures have a
standard representation of values that can easily be rep-
resented as an NxM image of 0-1 normalized pixel values.
Unfortunately, network traffic does not easily lend itself to
this format. First, packet lengths vary considerably. Second,
and equally problematic, different packet types contain en-
tirely different information (e.g., a UDP packet cannot be
represented as a TCP packet). To create a general represen-
tation of network traffic that is usable across both different
classification techniques and different problems, we define a
list of requirements for a packet representation:
• Complete: each feature is represented for every packet:
every bit of data in each packet must be able to be in-
cluded in the representation.
• Aligned: every location in the representation has the
same meaning across all packets, which allows models
to perform representation learning according to fixed
locations in the packet bitfield.
• Constant size: the size of the representation is the
same for each packet.
• Normalized: all features lie between 0 and 1.
• Efficient size: the size of the representation for each
packet can be feasibly used to train deep learning mod-
els.
3.2 Strawman Representations
To put nPrint in context, we discuss possible representations
that can be used for network traffic in learning pipelines.
Semantic network representation. A semantic view of net-
work traffic involves packets being broken up into headers,
with each header broken into header fields, such as TCP
source port or IP total length fields. One straightforward rep-
resentation of a packet that can be used for training models
involves directly encoding each header value as a feature.
This representation is aligned, and can capture many of the
header fields. Figure 1 shows an example of the semantic
representation.
This conventional, semantic view of network traffic has
several drawbacks. First, it is not complete. Although it cap-
tures named header fields that are easily represented as inte-
gers, parts of the packets with less structure are much harder
to represent to a model. For example, the payload of a packet
has no consistent semantic mapping, making it incredibly
difficult to capture in a named feature.
Another subtle issue with encoding each specific field with
its corresponding value is the loss of ordering. For example,
IP and TCP headers have options section where a host can
encode options specific to the packet being sent. The order
of these options has been used as a predictive feature for
some classification problems, which is lost in a semantic
representation that parses each option [19].
Finally, semantic representations may encounter difficul-
ties when mapping values from their semantic meaning to a
continuous value space for training models. Network ports
exhibit a unique problem for semantic representations: they
do not correctly map to a continuous valued feature. For
example, TCP port 79 is the Finger protocol, while TCP port
80 is used for HTTP traffic. Although these ports are close
numerically, they have no semantic correlation with each
other.
Finally, the semantic representation is not normalized.
Normalizing the values for each feature in each classification
problem requires extra passes of the input data to scale each
value, which must be carefully considered as the size of
network traffic traces grows quickly.
One-hot encoded semantic representation. A typical method
for avoiding issues with continuous value representation is
to use a one-hot-encoding of specific features. A one-hot-
encoding (OHE) of a feature transforms one feature with n
different known values into n binary features with possible
values of 0 or 1. However, one-hot-encoding features across
different types of packet headers quickly results in a packet
representation that violates the efficient size requirement.
For example, one-hot encoding the TCP source port alone
could add over 65,000 features to a representation for a single
packet. Sequence numbers, acknowledgement numbers, and
checksums further contribute to this explosion of features.
One-hot-encoding also requires processing the entire dataset
for each problem to determine the n values that exist for each
feature.
Naive binary representation. Rather than relying on seman-
tic information, we can instead employ a representation that
simply models each packet as a raw bitmap. This choice leads
to a consistent, normalized, efficient size representation that
creates a 1xM “image” of each packet which can be directly
fed into machine learning models. We see an example of this
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Figure 2: nPrint, the complete, aligned packet representation. Headers that do not exist in the packet being transformed are zero filled, while
headers that exist but are not of maximum size are zero padded for alignment across nPrints.
representation in Figure 1. Transforming each packet into
its bitmap representation ignores many of the intricate de-
tails that must be considered when modeling network traffic,
namely varying size and different types of packets. These
issues can cause two packets to have different meanings for
bit i in the representation. For example, a TCP packet and a
UDP packet would have completely different values repre-
sented at the same bit location. Figure 1 shows this problem
in detail.
Worse, this problem can occur even within two packets of
the same type. For example, an TCP/IP packet with IP options
and an TCP/IP packet without IP options will cause the bits
to be misaligned in the two representations. Misalignment
manifests itself in two ways: 1) the resulting representation
is not interpretable, as we cannot correctly map each bit in
the representation back to a semantic meaning; and 2) it can
decrease model performance as the misaligned bits introduce
noise in the model where important features may exist.
3.3 nPrint
We build upon the naive binary representation of a packet
to create a representation that meets all of the requirements.
Figure 2 introduces nPrint, a single packet representation
which is designed to be directly used with machine learning
methods, allowing models to learn important characteristics
of the traffic, rather than manually encoding it. nPrint meets
all of our design requirements: it is complete, aligned, con-
stant size, normalized, and of efficient size. nPrint is complete:
any packet can be represented. It is aligned and constant size:
using internal padding and including space for each header
type regardless of whether that header is actually present in
a given packet ensures that each packet is represented in the
same number of features, and that each feature has the same
meaning. Alignment gives nPrint a distinct advantage over
many network representations in that it is interpretable at
the bit level. This allows for researchers and practitioners
to map nPrint back to the semantic realm to better under-
stand the features that are driving the performance of a given
model. For instance, for the model to learn that the TCP RST
flag is an important feature for a given problem, it must be
in the same bitmap location across all packets. Not allmodels
are interpretable, but by having an interpretable represen-
tation, we can better understand models that are. nPrint is
also normalized: by directly using the bits of the packets
and filling missing values with 0, each feature lies between
0 and 1. Finally, nPrint is efficiently sized: the size of the
representation in Figure 2 is 1,088 + n payload features for a
packet, where n is defined by the user. We make the payload
features optional in nPrint as many problems may deal with
encrypted traffic.
A single nPrint represents one packet. Many classification
problems require sets of packets. nPrint can be easily ex-
tended to multi-packet learning problems (in about 20 lines
of Python code). If we consider each single nPrint as a 1xM
image, where M is the number of features in the fingerprint,
we can create a NxM nPrint for multi-packet learning prob-
lems. Each NxM packet image can then be used as a single
sample for training different model architectures.
Finally, nPrint is extendable and modular: protocols, such
as ICMP, can be easily added or removed from the repre-
sentation without invalidating any of the representation
requirements or deriving new features from the protocols
themselves.
4 THE NPRINT PIPELINE
This section discusses in detail each step of the pipeline we
use in this work. Figure 3 shows a conventional machine
learning pipeline and where nPrint fits in the pipeline.
Figure 3: nPrint results in a general network traffic representation that can be applied to a variety of machine learning methods and tasks.
4.1 Input
nPrint takes two types of inputs. First, standard PCAPswhere
network traffic is most often recorded. Second, hex-encoded
strings of packets in a CSV format which are compact and
created as output of some network scanning tools such as
Zmap [8].
4.2 Packet Transformation and Data
Representation
nPrint transforms each packet into the standard nPrint rep-
resentation described in Section 3. We implement nPrint
in C++ to efficiently transform packets at about 1 million
packets per minute on a single thread. We further explore
the performance of nPrint in Section 4.4. Although we do
not examine problems that concern time information such
as website fingerprinting, we have implemented in nPrint
the option to include a relative timestamp to capture time-
series information. Finally, we do not consider IPv6 in this
work, but we have implemented IPv6 fixed header parsing
in nPrint, which will be included in the tool.
4.2.1 Compressing nPrint to Decrease Training Time. AnPrint
is of efficient size, but there remain multiple avenues to com-
press the number of features that must be considered for a
given classification problem. We aim to compress the rep-
resentation to reduce disk use and decrease model training
time. We notice that many parts of a packet header are ei-
ther unused or static. For instance, the reserved bits in the
TCP and IPv4 headers can likely be dropped from the packet
representation, along with other parts of the header that are
essentially constant values, such as the IPv4 version number
bits.
We compress a nPrint by removing all features in the
dataset that have no variance. Doing so eliminates features
that are not useful for classification, reduces the size of the
DNN models, and increases the speed of training and classi-
fication. This compression method also results in a represen-
tation that remains interpretable.
Other methods of compressing a nPrint are possible. For
instance, tailoring which packet headers to include in the
final representation is a quick method to reduce the repre-
sentation size. For example, a nPrint can be reduced by 480
features if TCP traffic is not of interest for a given classifica-
tion problem. In each case, the representation requirements
mentioned in Section 3.2 still hold. This method is useful
to reduce disk space while collecting traffic traces. We note
here that while this compression method requires “expert
intervention”, the question of “is TCP traffic important for the
problem?” is much easier to answer than “how do we choose
and represent each field in the packet?”
Perhaps the most efficient way to compress a nPrint is by
use of an Autoencoder. Autoencoders are DNN architectures
that learn efficient data representation for sets of data by
reducing the dimensionality of the data. An autoencoder
learns representations in an unsupervised setting, wherein it
compresses a sample of data and then attempts to rebuild the
original sample from the compressed form. Autoencoders
learn to create a compressed representation that contains
information almost equivalent to the original representation.
Although an autoencoder may create the most efficient rep-
resentation of a nPrint, we choose not to use this method
in this work as the new representation would not be inter-
pretable. We highlight their use for compression here for
cases where representation size is of higher importance than
interpretability.
4.3 Model Training
nPrint is a single packet representation that is usable in multi-
ple types of models, including DNN architectures and ensem-
ble learning techniques. We choose to train and test nPrint
on three types of models: multi-layer perceptrons, convolu-
tional neural networks, and random forests. Details of MLPs
and CNNs are explained in Section 2. Here we choose these
models to test both deep learning and ensemble learning
techniques using nPrint, but nPrint can be combined with
any model, as well as unsupervised learning techniques.
Metrics. We define a false positive for class C as any sample
that is not of class C, but misclassified as class C by the
classifier. A false negative for class C is any sample of class
C that is not classified as class C. We then evaluate each
trained model using multiple metrics including accuracy,
ROC AUC, and F1 scores. We use a balanced accuracy score
to account for any class imbalance in the data. In the multi-
class classification case we consider ROC scores in a "one vs
rest" manner, where each class C is considered as a binary
classification task between C and each other class. F1 scores
represent a weighted average of precision and recall. In the
multi-class classification task we report an F1 score that is
calculated by counting the total number of true positives,
false positives, and false negatives.
Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP). We use an 8 layer model for
the MLP, starting with an input layer consisting of a number
of neurons equal to the number of features in the given
representation. The input layer is followed by 4 successive
pairs of fully connected layers consisting of 5,000, 5,000, 5,000
and 2,500 neurons and dropout layers with a rate of 0.25,
0.25 0.25, and 0.50 respectively. The output layer consists
of a number of neurons equal to the number of classes in
the dataset. The activation function for the output layer
is set to the sigmoid function for multiclass classification
tasks and softmax for binary classification tasks. We use
a SGD optimizer and set the loss function to categorical
cross-entropy loss for multiclass classification and binary
cross-entropy loss for binary classification tasks.
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). We use an 11 layer
VGG-based convolutional network for the CNN starting with
a convolutional layer consisting of 32 convolutional filters
each of size 3x3, an input shape equal to the size of the
NxM representation being trained on, and a reLU activation
function. This layer is followed by an identical convolutional
2D layer and then a max pooling layer of size 2x2. The max
pooling layer is followed by a flatten layer and three pairs of
fully connected layers consisting of 2,000, 2,000, and 1,000
neurons followed by dropout layers with a dropout rate of .5,
.25, and .25 respectively. Finally, we have a fully connected
layer of 500 neurons followed by an output layer fit with a
sigmoid activation function for multiclass classification and
softmax for binary classification. We use a SGD optimizer
and set the loss function to categorical cross-entropy loss for
multiclass classification tasks and binary cross-entropy loss
for binary classification tasks.
Random Forest (RF). To directly interpret the feature im-
portance of each bit in nPrint, we consider a third, non-DNN
model using a random forest ensemble classifier. We specifi-
cally choose random forests as the binary features in nPrint
lend themselves to a decision tree structure. Random forest
Problem # Packets nPrint Transformation(Seconds)
LOC
(Python)
Active Fingerprinting 274,010 14 16
Passive OS Detection 1,343,920 54 27
Application Identification 46,816 12 33
Table 1: nPrint currently transforms over 1million packets per minute
on a single thread.
models do not consider two-dimensional sets of features.
Therefore, we must flatten any two-dimensional feature vec-
tor before using the classifier. We use SciKit Learn’s random
forest implementation for the classifications, with 1,000 es-
timators and a “balanced” class weight to account for any
imbalances in dataset labels [27].
4.4 Performance Evaluation
Finally, we implement, evaluate, and publish (upon publi-
cation) nPrint, as well as the entire pipeline presented in
Figure 3. We believe that performance must be accounted
for when employing the method shown in this work. To this
end, we have implemented nPrint in C++, which transforms
each packet in an input file into a nPrint. We evaluate the
performance of the pipeline on a system with two 8-core,
2.6 GHz CPUs (Intel Xeon E5 2640) and 128 GB of RAM. Deep
learning models are trained on a machine with two NVIDIA
TITAN RTX graphics cards, with a total of 64 GB of RAM.
Table 1 shows the performance of nPrint on each of the
problems we have evaluated in this work. Ultimately we
find that nPrint can currently transform packets at over 1
million packets per minute, on a single thread. If higher
performance is required, one can run the packet transformer
on multiple PCAPs at once. We also note that nPrint can be
run on systems with incredibly limited RAM, as only a single
packet is stored in memory at any given time.
nPrint can currently transform IPv4, fixed IPv6 headers,
UDP, TCP, ICMP, and payloads. nPrint also has the capability
to include a relative timestamp field for problems that may
need timing information. We demonstrate the flexibility of
nPrint in Section 7.3, where we used nPrint to rapidly test
the performance of different constraints on the problem.
Each problem to be solved with nPrint does require some
tuning to match nPrint with labels. Table 1 shows the min-
imal amount of effort required to test each additional type
of problem, requiring as little as 16 lines of Python code to
modify nPrint for the active fingerprinting problem. All of
this work is associating each nPrint with a label for training,
not additional feature engineering.
Finally, Table 2 shows the amount of training time for
each model we train on each problem. All models are trained
on each dataset in under 30 minutes. Each row represents a
single fold of the data when performing cross validation.
Model Training Time (Minutes)
Problem CNN(150 Epochs)
FNN
(150 Epochs) Random Forest
Active Fingeprinting 20 10 1
Passive OS Detection 25 10 6
Application Identification 5 3 0.5
Table 2: Approximate model training time for each separate problem
we examine. nPrint supplies a standard representation for models to
efficiently train on.
Vendor Device Type Probed Devices Responsive Devices
Cisco Network Device 1,500 1,451
Miktrotik Network Device 1,500 1,358
Huawei Network Device 1,500 1,409
H3C Network Device 1,500 1,380
NEC Network Device 1,500 1,450
Lancom Network Device 1,500 1,426
Juniper Network Device 1,500 1,445
Adtran Network Device 1,500 1,449
ZTE Network Device 1,500 1,425
Ubiquoss Network Device 1,500 1,476
Dell Network Device 1,500 1,449
Avtech IoT Camera 2,672 2,152
Axis IoT Camera 2,900 2,653
Chromecast IoT Streaming 2,984 2,872
Roku IoT Streaming 2,966 2,403
Table 3: The active device fingerprinting dataset.
Ultimately, we find that nPrint, combined with machine
learning models, allows for rapid testing of classification
problems, allowing researchers and practitioners to spend
a larger amount of time understanding model performance
rather than developing features for the models.
5 ACTIVE DEVICE FINGERPRINTING
We first examine the utility of nPrint to extract features
from packets in active device fingerprinting. Specifically, we
compare the performance of models trained with nPrint to
Nmap, one of the most popular device fingerprinting tools,
which has been developed for over 20 years.
Nmap’s approach to fingerprinting remote devices is to
send specifically crafted probes which have been fine-tuned
over the course of the tool’s lifetime. Nmap’s detection sys-
tem consists of 16 probes: 13 TCP, 2 ICMP, and 1 UDP. These
probes are designed to elicit responses that give insight into
quirks of different device types, such as TCP sequence gen-
eration, TCP options, and ICMP response behavior. Nmap
transforms the responses to the probes into a fingerprint of
the device using a collection of over 25 tests. Table 4 shows
a summary of the tests Nmap performs on the responses to
the probes it sends. Many of Nmap’s most complex tests are
performed by examining data from both the sent probes and
the responses to those probes, comparing sent and received
values.
5.1 Input (Packets)
We run Nmap on a collection of labeled devices to compare
nPrint’s performance to Nmap’s hand engineered features.
Holland et al. previously examined using a subset of Nmap’s
probes to fingerprint network device vendors at Internet
scale [15]. They curate a labeled dataset of network devices
through an iterative clustering technique on SSH, Telnet,
and SNMP banners, which provides a list of labeled network
devices to Nmap.
Although this previous work was concerned with finger-
printing devices at scale, we are only concerned with nPrint’s
performance against Nmap’s full suite of features. As such,
we downsample the labeled network device dataset to create
a set of devices to Nmap. This dataset is shown in Table 3.
We further expand the types of devices we are testing
to test the adaptability of nPrint across a larger range of
device types. To this end, we add a new device category to
the dataset: Internet of Things (IoT) devices. We gather labels
for four types of IoT devices, 2 IoT cameras and 2 IoT TV
streaming devices through Shodan [30]. Table 3 shows the
distribution of labels from Shodan.
UDP Response
ICMP Response 1
ICMP Response 2
TCP Response 1
Response ...
21 Rows
788 Features (bits)
Figure 4: Visualizing a 2D nPrint Nmap fingerprint. Rows and
columns are consistent across each fingerprint.
We modify Nmap to output the raw packet responses
to each probe and Nmap each device in the dataset. Ta-
ble 3 shows the distribution of devices that responded to
Nmap’s probes, which constitutes the final active finger-
printing dataset.
5.2 Packet Transformation and Data
Representation
Nmap. Nmap transforms the responses to each probe into
a fingerprint using a series of tests. We convert the finger-
prints that Nmap generates into a feature vector for each
device by considering each feature as a categorical feature
and one-hot-encoding the values in the fingerprints. Holland
et al. show this technique to be effective using Nmap’s closed
Test Name Summary Nmap Weight nPrint Importance
Explicit Congestion Notification TCP Explicit Congestion control flag. 100 12
ICMP Response Code ICMP Response Code. 100 10
Integrity of returned probe IP Checksum Valid checksum in an ICMP port unreachable. 100 Inapplicable
Integrity of returned probe UDP Checksum UDP header checksum received match. 100 Inapplicable
IP ID Sequence Generation Algorithm Algorithm for IP ID. 100 Inapplicable
IP Total Length Total length of packet. 100 6
Responsiveness Target responded to a given probe. 100 Inapplicable
Returned probe IP ID value IP ID value. 100 7
Returned Probe IP Total Length IP Length of an ICMP port unreachable. 100 4
TCP Timestamp Option Algorithm TCP timestamp option algorithm. 100 Inapplicable
Unused Port unreachable Field Nonzero Last 4 bytes of ICMP port unreachable message not zero. 100 Inapplicable
Shared IP ID Sequence Boolean Shared IP ID Sequence between TCP and ICMP. 80 Inapplicable
TCP ISN Greatest Common Divisor Smallest TCP ISN increment. 75 Inapplicable
DonâĂŹt Fragment ICMP IP DonâĂŹt Fragment bit for ICMP probes. 40 Inapplicable
TCP Flags TCP flags. 30 9
TCP ISN Counter Rate Average rate of increase for the TCP ISN. 25 Inapplicable
TCP ISN Sequence Predictability Index Variability in the TCP ISN. 25 Inapplicable
IP DonâĂŹt Fragment Bit IP DonâĂŹt Fragment bit. 20 8
TCP Acknowledgment Number TCP acknowledgment number. 20 5
TCP Miscellaneous Quirks TCP implementations, e.g, reserved field in TCP header. 20 13
TCP Options Test TCP header options, preserving order. 20 1
TCP Reset Data Checksum Checksum of data in TCP reset packet. 20 Inapplicable
TCP Sequence Number TCP sequence number. 20 4
IP Initial Time-To-Live IP initial time-to-live. 15 3
TCP Initial Window Size TCP window size. 15 2
Table 4: Nmap device detection rules. nPrint discovers many of these without manual feature engineering and assigns different weights to features
than Nmap.
port probes, which comprise only 6 of the 16 probes Nmap
sends to each device. We consider every probe Nmap sends
when transforming each fingerprint into a feature vector.
Nmap uses an internal heuristic, not machine learning, to
determine the class of a device. We compare nPrint against
Nmap’s features in machine learning models to better under-
stand the differences in performance due to features, instead
of classification method. We make this decision as we find
that some of the devices in our dataset, including 2 of the
IoT devices, do not exist in Nmap’s fingerprint database.
nPrint. We use the raw responses generated from the mod-
ified version of Nmap to build a nPrint for each device. Here
we use the same response packets that Nmap uses to build
a nPrint. Further, while Nmap computes many of its fea-
tures across both sent and received packets, we only use the
received packets when building a nPrint for each device.
nPrint is a single-packet representation, while Nmap’s
classification represents a multi-packet learning problem.We
must transform each Nmap response into a nPrint using the
custom packet transformer and then build two-dimensional
fingerprint for each device. An example of a 2D nPrint is
shown in 4. We recognize that some work must be done to
tailor nPrint to a specific classification problem, but point
out that the amount of effort required is minimal compared
to manually engineering features. For example, tailoring the
single-packet nPrint packets into the 2D fingerprint shown
in Figure 4 took only 16 lines of Python code.
We now examine in detail the fingerprint shown in Fig-
ure 4. First, we notice there are 21 rows in the fingerprint,
while Nmap only sends 16 probes to the device. Nmap re-
sends probes that do not garner a response up to three times.
It uniquely re-names these probes. Rather than disambiguate
the names, which is unreliable due to the unique naming
scheme, we consider each uniquely named Nmap response
as a row in the nPrint. This does not give us access to any
information than Nmap does not use, and at worst duplicates
data already in the nPrint. We fill any row (probe response)
with 0’s if the device did not respond to the probe. This
2D fingerprint can be flattened to 1 dimension, without los-
ing representation interpretability, in 3 lines of python code
for use with ensemble methods. Finally, for the active fin-
gerprinting case it is important that ordering of the rows
(responses) is consistent across each nPrint.
We compress the nPrint fingerprints by dropping each
bit in the representation that has zero variance. Ultimately,
we find that this compression method removes almost half
of the bits (1,488 to 788) in the representation, decreasing
model size and training time while maintaining the inter-
pretability of the representation. As we remove only static
bits, this compression has no effect on model performance,
only training time.
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Figure 5: Nmap’s hand curated features perform well on the active
fingerprinting task.
5.3 Model Training
We train MLP, CNN, and random forest models on nPrint
and MLP and random forest models on the one-hot-encoded
fingerprints generated from Nmap’s tests. Each metric re-
ported represents the mean across 5-fold cross validation.
Figures 5 and 6 show the ROC and PR curves of the ran-
dom forest classifier for both Nmap and nPrint. Immediately,
models can differentiate the devices without manual feature
engineering.
Table 5 shows the performance ofmodels trained on nPrint
across differentmodels compared toNmap’s hand engineered
features. We see that, across the same models, nPrint is able
to match Nmap’s long-developed hand engineered features
without access to the sent probes. For example, in the ran-
dom forest, Nmap achieves a 92.2 F1 score and a 99.3 ROC
AUC, while nPrint achieves a 92.1 F1 score and a 99.3 ROC
AUC.
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Figure 6: nPrint provides equivalent performance to expert-derived
features, even without access to Nmap’s sent probes.
We have demonstrated that nPrint can be used to automat-
ically extract information from packets. In Section 3.2, we
presented multiple representation requirements and possible
representations of network traffic. We now examine the pit-
falls of the representations we did not choose by evaluating
each representation using the active fingerprinting dataset.
Semantic representation. First, we train and evaluate a
model with a variant of the semantic header representation.
We transform each packet in the fingerprint into a collection
of features that correspond to each header field. Each header
field’s value is considered as a continuous value. We fill any
header field not present in a specific packet with a 0 for that
feature. Ultimately this transformation led to each sample
consisting of 21 rows (packets) and 38 features. Here creating
a semantic representation of network traffic has problems
that are eliminated with nPrint. For example, a semantic rep-
resentation of this type can only consider named fields, and
Representation Model Accuracy AUC ROC F1
Nmap RF 92.4 99.3 92.2
Nmap MLP 90.9 98.6 90.6
Semantic RF 91.3 99.3 91.7
Semantic MLP 85.9 96.9 86.8
Semantic CNN 89.0 96.6 88.8
Naive Binary RF 90.1 99.1 90.7
Naive Binary MLP 70.3 95.6 69.9
Naive Binary CNN 90.9 96.2 91.2
nPrint RF 91.7 99.3 92.1
nPrint MLP 86.2 97.4 87.0
nPrint CNN 90.3 98.3 90.9
Table 5: Semantic encoding achieves high performance but requires
protocol specific feature extraction. The naive binary representation
does not require feature extraction but sacrifices performance. nPrint
achieves high performance without the need to extract semantic fea-
tures.
is forced to ignore the payload of each packet as it cannot
be reliably mapped to specifically named fields.
Table 5 shows that this semantic representation is suc-
cessful for the active fingerprinting task. Although we see
success in active fingerprinting, the representation still vi-
olates the representation requirements outline in Section 3.
Furthermore, the semantic representation is still slightly out-
performed by nPrint.
Naive binary representation. Finally, we examine the per-
formance of the naive binary representation presented in
Section 3.2. We transform each packet into its binary form
and pad with 0’s to the maximum packet size, resulting in
a fingerprint for each device of 21 rows (packets) and 2,248
features. Table 5 shows that we achieve high performance
just by naively considering each packet as a bitmap. More
interestingly, this raw bitstring format generally results in
a performance loss compared with nPrint. What we see is
that the variable header length of network traffic mis-aligns
the bits in each packet, introducing noise into the classifier.
We stress that network traffic has many quirks that must be
carefully considered when representing it to machine learn-
ing models. Further, blindly converting network traffic to its
bitmap representation results in representations that cannot
be translated back to their semantic meanings.
5.4 Feature Importance
We leverage the ability to map nPrint back to the semantic
realm to examine the features that are driving the perfor-
mance of the random forest model. Figure 7 shows a heatmap
of the feature importances gathered from the random forest
model trained on nPrint. This visualization illustrates the
ability to interpret the bits that are driving the performance
of the model can provide insight into what is differentiating
the classes.
In this instance, we find that the TCP source port of the
response probes are one of the more important features in
classifying the device vendor. Upon further inspection, we
find that Nmap does a port scan to find an open port to
sent its open-port probes to. The IoT devices each have a
specific port that is found to be open during the port scan
that identify the class of devices from the routers. We also
see that the TCP window size and many of the payload bits
are important in classifying the device vendor. The payload
bits are important in this case as Nmap sends a UDP probe to
a closed port that elicits an ICMP error response back which
contains the original packet that caused the error. Many
devices copy differing amounts of the original packet in the
ICMP error, indicating their underlying operating systems.
Finally, Table 4 directly compares the feature rankings
learned by the model trained on nPrint to Nmap’s internal
heuristic weights. We see that nPrint places vastly different
weights on many of the features that are directly comparable,
with nPrint placing much higher importance on the TCP
options and the TCP window size than Nmap’s heuristic.
6 PASSIVE OS FINGERPRINTING
We now study the generalizability of nPrint by applying it
to a different context: passive OS fingerprinting; determin-
ing the operating system of a device from network traffic
that is collected passively, as opposed to sending specially
crafted probes to the device. We compare the performance
of a learning pipeline that utilizes nPrint to p0f, one of the
most commonly used passive OS fingerprinting tools.
p0f utilizes an array of passive traffic fingerprinting mech-
anisms to identify the OS behind any TCP/IP communica-
tion. p0f relies on a user-curated database of signatures to
determine the operating system of any given device. p0f gen-
erates small fingerprints of device traffic and looks for direct
matches in its database for each OS.
6.1 Input (Packets)
We leverage the CICIDS2017 intrusion detection evaluation
dataset, which contains PCAPs of over 50GB of network
traffic over the course of 5 days [29]. The traffic contains
labeled operating systems ranging from Ubuntu to Windows
to MacOS. There are 17 hosts in the IDS dataset, but we find
only 13 with usable traffic. The resulting devices are listed
in the first column of Table 6.
6.2 Packet Transformation and Data
Representation
p0f. p0f extracts a limited number of fields from each
packet and looks directly in a fingerprint database to find a
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Figure 7: Per-bit feature importance for active fingerprinting (ran-
dom forest). Brighter colors are more important. Given the nPrint
representation, ML models can learn important features (e.g., IP TTL,
window size), as opposed to relying on manual engineering.
matching OS for the extracted fields. We run p0f, without
modifications, to determine the operating system of the de-
vice that generated a given traffic sample. More specifically,
we take the first 100,000 packets seen for each device and
split them into 1,000, 100-packet traffic samples. We then
run p0f on each separated 100-packet traffic sample.
nPrint. We split the traffic into 100 packet samples for each
device, using the same traffic as the p0f runs. We transform
each packet sample into a nPrint. Figure 8 visualizes a nPrint
for passive OS detection. We drop the IP source address,
the IP destination address, the TCP source and destination
ports, and the TCP sequence and acknowledgement numbers
from the representation to avoid direct identifiers of specific
Host
p0f nPrint
Accepted Guess Precision Recall Precision Recall
Kali Linux Kali Linux - - 100.0 100.0
Mac OS X Mac OS X 10.x 100.0 0.88 100.0 0.99
Ubuntu 14.4 32B
Linux 3.11
and newer
100.0 0.69
100.0 0.99
Ubuntu 14.4 64B 100.0 0.65
Ubuntu 16.4 32B 100.0 0.79
Ubuntu 16.4 64B 100.0 0.68
Ubuntu Server 100.0 0.14
Web Server 100.0 0.14
Windows 10
Windows 7 or 8
0.98 0.09
100.0 100.0
Windows 10 Pro 100.0 0.14
Windows 7 Pro 100.0 0.71
Windows 8.1 0.99 0.77
Windows Vista 100.0 0.71
Table 6: Performance of nPrint vs. p0f for passive OS fingerprint-
ing. nPrint achieves finer granularity for OS fingerprinting and near
perfect precision and recall.
Packet 1
Packet 2
Packet 3
Packet ...
Packet 100
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Figure 8: Visualizing a 2D nPrint for passive OS detection. 100 packet
sequences capture handshake behavior that p0f uses for fingerprinting
operating systems.
devices, rather than general operating system characteristics.
Furthermore, we only use the IP and TCP headers to better
compare nPrint to p0f. We compress each nPrint by dropping
bits with zero variance across the entire dataset, reducing
the amount of features in each nPrint from 800 to 420.
6.3 Model Training
nPrint. We train MLP, CNN, and random forest models
on nPrint, finding minimal performance difference between
the models. Figure 9a shows that nPrint’s ROC AUC val-
ues are generally above .90 for most devices, with multi-
ple devices being .99. We do see lower performance within
the Ubuntu 14.4 and 16.4 devices, with ROC AUC values
as low as .79. Figure 9b examines in more detail the per-
formance of the model trained on nPrint. The classifier is
learning to separate operating system characteristics at a
high level, with the vast majority of the confusion being
within the same operating system. Specifically, we see that
the classifier is able to separate the devices into 6 classes: Kali
Linux, Mac OS X, Ubuntu, the Web Server, Windows, and
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Figure 9: Passive OS fingerprinting ROC and confusion matrix for
nPrint. Models trained with nPrint learn to identify operating systems
at a finer granularity (e.g., versions) than p0f.
Windows Vista. Figure 9b also shows us that bit versions of
the same operating systems are virtually indistinguishable,
and that Windows 10 and Windows 10 Pro are difficult to
distinguish. Both of these observations are not surprising,
but we note there are clear limitations to operating system
detection at this granularity.
p0f. To compare nPrint to p0f, we run p0f on the split files
and gather all of the operating system estimates generated
by the tool. p0f outputs an operating system guess only on
packets that directly match a fingerprint in p0fs database, so
the number of estimates varies between samples. We treat
each estimate as a vote. For each sample, we tally the number
of correct votes, incorrect votes, and cases where p0f offered
no estimate. Using these values we calculate the precision
and recall for each experiment. Table 6 shows the precision
and recall for 100 packet samples.
p0f’s precision is typically quite high, meaning that when
it does guess the OS of a device it is correct. However, the
recall values are often quite low as p0f regularly does not
offer a vote for the sample, depending on host. P0f did not
output a single vote for the Kali Linux machine. Interestingly,
the granularity at which p0f offers operating system guesses
is very low, classifying all Ubuntu devices, and theweb server,
as “Linux 3.11 and newer”, and all of the Windows devices as
“Windows 7 or 8”. Interestingly, we found that nPrint was able
to find distinct differences in Windows Vista from the other
operating systems, but p0f makes no such distinction. To
better compare nPrint directly to p0f, we use the “Accepted
Guess” for p0f as a new label for each host and retrain a
classifier using the 4, coarser-grain classes. Table 6 shows the
results of this less granular classification. We see that nPrint
has almost perfect precision and recall on the less granular
problem. Here we stress the utility of nPrint because we can
examine classification performance at different granularities,
and even find new fingerprints for devices that may not
currently be captured, such as the Windows Vista and Kali
Linux differences that nPrint finds but p0f does not.
Finally, we seek to further verify that nPrint detects op-
erating systems generally, rather than learning to identify
specific devices. We set up an experiment where we compare
sets of devices that share a common operating system. We
take the five Ubuntu hosts and five Windows hosts in the
dataset and set up a binary classification task in which we
iteratively select pairs from the two lists to train a model,
and test against the remaining hosts in the lists.
nPrint differentiates between Ubuntu and Windows ma-
chines with perfect balanced accuracy, ROC AUC scores, and
F1 scores no matter which device pair was used for train-
ing. This is due to the different initial IP time-to-live that
is set by the two operating systems which the model im-
mediately learns. This experiment further illustrates that
models can successfully identify operating systems gener-
ally from nPrint, as opposed memorizing individual device
characteristics.
6.4 Feature Importance
Finally, we examine the feature importances for each bit in
the IP and TCP headers for the passive operating system
use case. Figure 10 shows the feature importance heatmaps.
For the IPv4 header, the most important features are in the
time-to-live (TTL) field and, to a lesser degree, the IPID field.
These results confirm past observations that TTL IPID can be
used for OS detection, because different operating systems
use different default values for those fields [4, 21].
In the TCP header, the window size field is the most im-
portant feature. We also observe that certain bits in the TCP
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Figure 10: Per-bit feature importance for passive OS detection (ran-
dom forest). Brighter colors are more important. Given the nPrint
representation, ML models can automatically discover important fea-
tures (e.g. IP TTL, window size), as opposed to relying on manual
engineering.
options can help determine OS as some OS’s include par-
ticular options by default such as maximum segment size,
window scaling, or selective acknowledgement permitted.
nPrint confirms much of the past literature on OS finger-
printing using certain header fields in network traffic. These
results also illustrate that nPrint can achieve high accuracy
without requiring hand-tailored feature engineering that
previous tools are built upon.
7 APPLICATION IDENTIFICATION
Finally, we test the ability of nPrint to identify applications.
More specifically, we aim to automatically identify the appli-
cation and browser that generated awebRTC handshakewith
nPrint when provided with the handshake traffic. MacMillan
et al. examined the feasibility of fingerprinting Snowflake,
a pluggable transport for Tor that leverages WebRTC to es-
tablish browser-to-browser connections [20], which is built
to be indistinguishable from other WebRTC services. They
collect almost 7,000 dTLS handshakes from four different
services: Facebook Messenger, Discord, Google Hangouts,
and Snowflake, across two browsers: Firefox and Chrome.
They then extract features from the handshakes to show that
each service is uniquely identifiable. We are interested in
using nPrint to automate this process entirely.
Application Handshakes
Browser Snowflake Facebook Google Discord
Firefox 991 796 1000 992
Chrome 0 784 995 997
Table 7: The application identification dataset.
Model Accuracy ROC AUC F1
FFN 99.8 99.8 99.8
CNN 100.0 100.0 100.0
RF 99.4 100.0 99.4
Table 8: Performance of models trained on nPrint. We see high per-
formance in each model, with the CNN achieving perfect performance
in all metrics considered.
7.1 Input (Packets)
Table 7 shows the almost 7,000 dTLS handshakes collected
by MacMillan et al.. MacMillan et al. examine the classifica-
tion task solely at the application level. We further split the
classification task into which specific browser, application
pair created the handshake, increasing the number of classes
in the task from four to seven.
7.2 Packet Transformation and Data
Representation
We take each handshake, which was captured and filtered
as a PCAP file, and transform it into a 2D nPrint, just as the
previous two applications of nPrint. The number of packets
in the handshakes vary from 4 to 13, we simply pad each
fingerprint with rows of 0s to the maximum capture size, and
allow the models trained on nPrint to identify the important
features in the traffic.We do not compress this representation
to test if the model is able to quickly filter out static bits in
the traffic. Each nPrint consists of the IPv4, UDP, and first
10 bytes of the payload. We choose the first 10 bytes of the
payload as the first few bytes of the TLS handshake messages
identify which type of message is contained.
7.3 Model Training
We train FFN, CNN, and random forest models on the dataset
in nPrint format. Table 8 shows the utility of nPrint on the
application identification problem. The CNN is actually able
to perform perfectly on the task, while the other two models
perform just slightly below perfection.
We now examine the ability of nPrint to quickly ask and
answer questions about constrained versions of the appli-
cation identification problem. We can quickly experiment
with the amount and type of traffic that must be saved to
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ID R D M Frag Offset
TTL Protocol Checksum
Source IP
Destination IP
Options
(a) IPv4
Source Port Destination Port
Length Checksum
(b) UDP
Payload
(c) Payload
Figure 11: Per-bit feature importance for (browser, application) iden-
tification (random forest). Brighter colors are more important. Given
the nPrint representation, ML models can learn important features
(e.g., length), as opposed to relying on manual engineering.
Features Accuracy ROC AUC F1
IPv4, UDP, 10 Payload Bytes 99.6 100.0 99.6
IPv4 96.6 99.9 96.9
UDP 99.5 99.9 99.6
10 Payload Bytes 77.4 95.0 78.8
25 Payload Bytes 99.7 100.0 99.7
100 Payload Bytes 99.7 100.0 99.7
Table 9: Evaluating constrained versions of the applicaiton identifca-
tion problem. nPrint allows researchers to better understand which
headers and payload bytes are needed for specific traffic analysis
problems.
disk for a given classification problem. Table 9 shows the
results of experimenting with different parts of the packet
using nPrint. For this problem, the UDP header alone can
be used, as the successive lengths of the packets define the
handshake for each class. However, we find that the first 10
bytes of the payload alone perform poorly on the classifica-
tion task, but with 25 payload bytes the classifier has much
higher performance. We stress that nPrint can be used as a
filtering mechanism for understanding differences in traffic.
Rather than working from traffic and trying to manually
extract differences to train a classifier with, we can instead
train a classifier and let the model inform us of the parts of
the packets important for classification. nPrint can be used
in this manner to help optimize storage space in large-scale
network data collection.
7.4 Feature Importance
We look to the feature importance of the random forest model
to better understand the semantic features driving the per-
formance in the model (Figure 11). We see that much of
what separates the classes is in the successive lengths of the
packets in the nPrint. Furthermore, the first ten bytes of the
payload, combined with these lengths, can accurately predict
the application and browser that generated the handshake.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper presented nPrint, a general, bitmap-based rep-
resentation of network traffic that can be used for a wide
variety of network traffic analysis problems. We developed
design requirements for a general representation of network
traffic, including the need for a complete, aligned, constant
size representation that is nonetheless compact enough to
be used as input for a variety of machine learning models,
including deep neural networks. We evaluated nPrint on
three supervised learning problems: device identification, as
compared with the widely used Nmap approach; operating
system identification, as compared with p0f; and application
identification, based on the contents of TLS handshakes.
We find that nPrint is at least as accurate as existing be-
spoke solutions to each problem across both deep learn-
ing and ensemble models. Furthermore, in contrast to exist-
ing approaches, which involve manual feature engineering
specifically to each traffic analysis task, nPrint can be em-
ployed employed across a wide variety of tasks, and the gen-
eral protocol-agnostic nature of the representation makes
it amenable to widespread use. Finally, nPrint has the ad-
ditional benefit that models can be retrained in the face of
changing scenarios (e.g., software upgrades, adversarial eva-
sion) without additional feature engineering.
We have released nPrint as an open-source software tool
and highly encourage others to employ the approach on other
traffic analysis problems—with a wider variety of datasets—
and extend the representation as appropriate. Our evaluation
shows promise for nPrint’s generality, but ultimately we en-
courage the evaluation of nPrint on more problems. Along
these lines, nPrint includes the ability to encode certain as-
pects of traffic such as sequencing and timing relationships
(e.g., packet sequences, relative timestamps). Although we
have not considered problems that leverage this information
in this work, the existence of this information in nPrint make
it a natural direction for future work.
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